










































































Recent studies have showed evidence of an existence of a size effect to be accounted for 
when computing the expected returns of a stock. 
In commercial banks across the Euro monetary union, this effect is not clear. The 
returns on portfolios sorted by size do not favor in a big manner none of the size sorted 
portfolios but show a slight tilt in favor of the smallest portfolios. 
We addressed the five factor Fama & French model and analyzed the returns by 
portfolio for this matter. 
In comparison with the non-financial companies we also could not set a big difference 
between them. In the end we showed that the size effect needs to be studied in a deeper 






Em anos recentes tem-se gerado discussões em volta da existência e influência do fator 
“tamanho” nos retornos das ações de mercado. O modelo de capital asset princing 
(CAPM), propõe uma relação direta entre o risco de mercado e o retorno do ativo. 
Enquanto os resultados dos testes diretos a esta proposta não saem conclusivos, 
evidências recentes sugerem a existência de fatores adicionais a ter em conta aquando 
do cálculo do preço de uma ação. Litzenberger e Ramaswamy (1979) mostram uma 
relação positiva entre o price-earnings ratio e os retornos esperados das ações não 
financeiras. Basu (1977) encontra uma relação entre book-to-market ratio e os retornos 
esperados. Já em 1992, Fama e French mostram evidências de que existe um fator 
relacionado com o tamanho que tem que se ter em conta a quando da avaliação de 
ações. Todos estes autores vêm propor a existência de um modelo melhor para avaliar 
ações de mercado do que o CAPM. Gandhi e Lusting (2015) são os primeiros autores 
que vêm documentar e desvendar este fator “tamanho” a ter em conta nos bancos 
comerciais para o mercado dos Estados Unidos da América. O nosso trabalho vem 
tentar desvendar e elucidar um pouco mais este fator tamanho a ter em conta para 
bancos comerciais, deste modo para o mercado Europeu. Nós seguimos os modelos e 
métodos utilizados por Gandhi e Lusting assim como Fama e French. Fomos construir 
portefólios do mais pequeno para o maior e correr regressões para avaliar os seus 
retornos. O resultado deste estudo é menos expressivo do que o resultado obtido pelos 
autores Gandhi e Lusting para o mercado Americano. No entanto, é possível ver uma 
ligeira tendência para que os portefólios constituídos pelos bancos mais pequenos, 
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In recent years there has been an argument about the existence and influence of the size 
effect in stock returns. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) presupposes a simple 
linear relationship between the expected return and the market risk of a security. While 
inconclusive test results from this relationship, recent evidence suggests an existence of 
additional factors relevant for asset pricing. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) show 
a positive relationship between price-earnings ratio and expected returns of common 
stocks. Basu (1977) finds that book-to-market ratio and expected returns are related. 
Fama and French (1993) show evidence of an inverse relationship between market value 
and common stock returns as well as a positive relationship with book-to-market ratio. 
All these authors came to propose an existence of better model to compute expected 
returns for common stock. Gandhi and Lusting (2015) are the first authors to document 
a size effect to be accounted for, when computing stock returns for commercial banks 
on the United States of America market.  The size effect has become theme of 
discussion in the recent years and especially on commercial banks. Our work comes in 
order to help to have a better understanding of this size effect and its real existence on 
commercial banks. We decided to uncover the existence of a size effect on commercial 
banks for the European monetary union market, with the purpose of adding one more 
piece of the puzzle on size effects for commercial banks. For us to document the 
existence of the size factors we followed the same process used by Gandhi and Lusting, 
and also by Fama and French. Small banks tend to earn abnormal excess returns when 
ranked by market value. Assuming a buying and selling strategy; going long on the 
smallest portfolio and short on the largest (by market value), would give abnormal 





whereas investing only on the largest would earn -2% per month. Also, the market beta 
is smaller for smaller firms by book value and market value (0,491 and 0,318), whereas 
for the largest firms is bigger (1,071 and 1,045), leading us to believe that largest 
commercial banks have higher market risk. In the next sections we will present the 
previous study in detail, the methodology and the results.    
In section 1, we will present the context of our work, the work developed so far by other 
authors on the subject and the derivation of this paper. In section 2, we will show the 
data used, the methodology and the basis of the work following. In section 3, we show 
the results and outputs of the work developed. And finally, in section 4, we will 
conclude with some explanations, suggestions and work to follow.   
 
1. Literature Review 
 
Since the findings by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) providing evidence that small 
size firms of common stock (small market capitalization) tend to earn, on average, 
higher risk adjusted returns than large size firms, that a lot of attention has been given to 
the size phenomenon. In his work, Banz (1981) suggests that the CAPM is miss-
specified. He argues that there is an inverse relation between firm size and the average 
returns between 1936-1977 period and thus there is a size effect to be accounted for on 
the asset pricing model. However, it is difficult to determine if it is the market value per 
se that matters or if it is just a proxy for an unknown additional risk factor that needs be 
accounted for in the equilibrium pricing model (Banz, 1981). In other words, it is still to 
uncover if is the raw market value of the firm that impacts the company´s stock returns, 





CAPM may lack significant empirical content since after testing for the relevance of 
Betas in the pricing model, he found that variations in estimated market betas are not 
systematically related to variations on average returns. He points that for the 1964-1979 
period, average returns on high beta stocks are not consistently different from average 
returns of low beta stocks, and even low beta stocks show higher average returns when 
compared with high beta stocks for the 1964-1979 period tested, roughly the same 
period that Banz (1981) reported the size anomalies on common stock returns.  In 1983, 
Basu corroborates the findings of a size effect by Banz, attributing the expected returns 
to the earning´s yield factor rather than to the size of common stocks. In line with Banz 
(1981), the author documented the same inverse relation between market value and 
adjusted returns. He also finds that firms of common stock with high Earnings/Price 
ratios earn, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than firms with low Earnings/Price 
ratios. Such results support the hypothesis of a misspecification of the equilibrium 
pricing model, at least for the period studied of 1963-1979. 
Keim (1983) reports the same size anomalies found by early authors for the same period 
of time (1963-1979) and makes the claim that these anomalous abnormal returns have 
more meaning in January relative to the remaining eleven months of the year. He 
confirms the negative relation between returns and size and shows that this relation is 
due in large scale to the January effect and even more to the first week of the month 
(50%), particularly on the first trading day of the year. Keim points out some reasons 
explaining this January effect (i.e tax loss selling or information releases by companies) 
but does not provide empirical support to them and leaves it to future studies. By then 
there were strong evidences that there was in fact a size effect and a misspecification of 





Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) argue that prices on NYSE for the period of 
(1973-1984) may be inefficient according to their studies. They found that strategies 
consisting in buying stocks with a high book value of common equity per share to 
market price per share and selling stocks with low book/price ratio would earn abnormal 
returns, attributing this effect to market inefficiency. On the other hand Bhandari (1988) 
evidenced a positive relation between expected returns on common stock and the 
debt/equity ratio. The author also says that if the leverage effect found through the ratio 
is just a proxy for risk, then, a measure of risk different from the market beta, needs to 
be used. In any case, the evidence presented by Bhandari is also a test for the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) validity. In this case, the results show that a better model is 
needed, or at least, a better CAPM. Chan and Chen (1988) on the other hand argued that 
this size effect must arise from either a misspecification of this effect or substantial 
errors in estimating betas of the tested portfolios. Chan and Chen tested the second 
hypotheses in their work. They found that when estimating the betas using the same 
method as Banz (1981), using five years of past data, the results come consistent with 
Banz (1981). However, when the betas are estimated using a longer period of time, the 
results come different, eliminating the explanatory power of the size effect of the cross-
sectional returns. These findings made Chan and Chen conclude that the imprecision in 
estimating the market beta in previous studies originated spurious results. Contradicting 
this theory, Jegadeesh (1992) tests the validity of the studies performed by Chan and 
Chen and uses the same procedures plus two additional sets of test portfolios that are 
constructed to have low cross-sectional correlation between beta and the size factor. 
Jegadeesh (1992, pp. 349) argues that it is difficult to “unambiguously attribute the 





and after testing with different sets of portfolios and estimation beta models, he 
concludes that the market beta “do not explain the cross-sectional differences in average 
returns”. Therefore, the size effect can´t be explained by the market Beta, which 
justifies its need to be clarified. In order to address the asset-pricing misspecification, 
Fama and French (1993) tested common risk factors between stocks and bonds using 
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory as a base model. They tested the explanatory power of 
four additional factors, more precisely the most traditional ones in the CAPM, 
documented in previews works, Size, Earnings/Price, Leverage and Book/Market for 
stocks [see Banz (1981), Basu (1983), Bhandari (1988) and Rosenberg et al. (1985)] 
and other two factors for bonds, changes in interest rates and default. The authors found 
that “used alone or in combination with other variables”, the market beta, “has little 
information about average returns”. “Used alone, Size, E/P, Leverage and book-to-
market equity have some explanatory power. In combination, Size and book-to-market 
equity seem to absorb the apparent roles of Leverage and E/P in average returns (Fama 
and French, 1993, pp. 4). The bottom-line is that Size and book-to-market equity do a 
good job explaining the cross-section of average returns on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ common stocks for the 1963-1990 period. Fama and French use SMB, HML 
and RMO as proxy´s for risk factors for stocks, representing the Size effect, book-to-
market effect and the market premium respectively, and TERM and DEF for bonds, 
representing the changes in interest rates and default respectively. They found that 
constructing a five factor asset pricing model with three stock factors and two bond 
factors do a good job explaining common variation in bond and stock returns as well as 
the cross-section of average returns, these findings are very important for the work 





pricing model related to a size effect and other measures of value, but the “why” is still 
a controversial theme. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishy (1994), henceforth LSV, once 
again show that value stocks (high B/M, E/P and small size stocks) tend to perform 
better than glamour stocks (Low B/M, E/P and big size stocks) and give some further 
light on why value strategies perform better than glamour strategies. They define 
Contrarian strategies as investments in low past growth and low future expected 
growth using a high (low) Cash flow/Price (E/P) as a proxy for a low (high) expected 
return. LSV also explore the claim by Fama and French (1992) that Value strategies are 
fundamentally riskier. The authors say that, in order “to be fundamentally riskier, value 
stocks must underperform glamour stocks with some frequency, and particularly in the 
states of the world when the marginal utility of wealth is high” (Lakonishok et al., 1994, 
pp. 1543). LSV find that this does not happen and thus, there is little, if any, support for 
value strategies to be fundamentally riskier. Explaining one of the reasons why 
contrarian strategies perform better than naive strategies (Extrapolation strategies) 
resides in the fact that individual investors and institutional money managers tend to 
look at the past high growth of stocks and extrapolate to future expected returns, making 
this type of stocks overpriced and value stocks underpriced. Another explanation not 
tested by the authors, has to do with the short-term horizons for both individual and 
institutional investors. As LSV reveal, in order to earn abnormal returns with value 
strategies, the investors need a 3 to 5 year horizon. This conclusion presents a 
divergence with the way in which individual investors tend to act, as they always look 
for fast returns (few months). The same occurs with institutional investors, who 
constantly need to show results to their sponsors in order to keep their jobs. 





reasons for the size effect and other value measures in stock returns reported in previous 
works were studied by other authors. Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) point to a 
selection bias on the COMPUSTAT data. Most authors, in previous works, use the 
COMPUSTAT platform to get the data to address the size effect. Kothari et al. (1995) 
suggest that the selection bias comes from a major COMPUSTAT data expansion 
occurred in 1978, where mostly surviving firms’1 data were included. Furthermore, 
“even in recent years, there are many firms with stock returns on the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) tapes, but financial data missing on 
COMPUSTAT” (Kothari et al., 1995, pp. 187).  Almost simultaneously, Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) contradict these findings, arguing that the sample 
selection bias on COMPUSTAT, if any, is trivial and exaggerated, and shouldn´t lead to 
big differences in returns.  Also Barber and Lyon (1997) give some strength on the 
findings by Chan et al. (1995) since, in combination with Davis (1994) and Chan, 
Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) that studied the same impact of size and book-to-market 
effects in returns, for a different period of time and different country. They found no 
relevant evidence of survivorship-bias2 and data-snooping3 bias in the COMPUSTAT 
data that could affect dramatically the estimates for these factors, and thus the results of 
Fama and French (1993), suggested by Kothari et al. (1995). The authors also enhance 
the weakening of the survivorship and snooping-data bias. In any year of the sample, 
they were able to reject the null-hypothesis that, the size or book-to-market premium, 
differ between financial and nonfinancial firms. These conclusions corroborate once 
more the findings by Fama and French on the explanatory power of size and book-to-
                                                          
1  Surviving firms are the ones that, according to the COMPUSTAT standards, are selected be a part of 
the data; non-delisted and meeting the minimum asset or market value requirements.      
2 Process of selecting things or people, in this case firms, which “survived” a selection process, 
overlooking those that did not.  





market on returns of common-stock. Despite the consistency of the Fama and French 
factors and the growing empirical support, there is always a controversy relative to the 
explanatory power of the factors found. Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that it is the 
firm´s characteristics rather than factor loadings that determinate expected returns. The 
authors say that relative distress drives stock returns, and B/M is a proxy for distress. 
Also firms with similar characteristics (like size and B/M) tend to enter in distress 
phases at the same time.  In response to this theory, Davis, Fama and French (2000) 
tested the same methods used by the previous authors but extended the data (1929-1997 
against 1973-1993) and found that the results from Daniel and Titman were period 
specific. In the sequence of the findings by (Fama and French, 1998, pp. 1997) that 
“value stocks tend to have higher returns than growth stocks in markets around the 
world”, Griffin (2002) tried to find the factor model that better explains time-series 
variation in international stock returns. Griffin tested the explanatory power of a 
domestic, world and international three-factor model from Fama and French (1993). He 
found that, for the full sample (1981-1995) and later period (1990-1995) the regressions 
results show that the domestic three-factor model has greater explanatory power and in 
most cases lower pricing errors than the world three-factor model. In the case of the 
international three-factor model, the intercepts that are farther from zero than the 
domestic models, indicating the presence of foreign factors, do not lead to a better 
pricing. In addition, the world and international models produce a less accurate forecast 
than the domestic three-factor model for returns. Likewise, Fama and French (2006) 
when trying to show the robustness of their findings on value premium relative to size 
and the explanatory power of CAPM, with an out-of-sample test, they found evidence 





period 1975-2004. In a recent paper, Fama and French (2012) find once more evidence 
of value premiums in average returns in four regions (North America, Europe, Japan 
and Asia Pacific). Similarly, they found strong momentum returns in all regions except 
Japan. For this matter they “tested whether value and momentum patterns in average 
returns are captured by empirical asset pricing models across regions” (Fama and 
French, 2012, pp.2). They examined how well global and region specific models, 
CAPM, Three-factor and four-factor model (taking momentum into consideration), 
capture average returns. In this paper the authors claim that global models do a poor job 
explaining the regional size-B/M portfolios, local three-factor models are quite passable 
for average returns on size-B/M portfolios in Japan and Europe and that nothing is 
added or lost in adding the momentum factor (four-factor model). When evaluating the 
global four-factor model, the authors say that it is acceptable for a global size-
momentum portfolio but it performs poorly on regional size-momentum portfolios. The 
bad specification of local size-momentum comes from Asia Pacific and Europe. In the 
European case, the four-factor model comes rejected for the European size-momentum 
returns. Nonetheless Fama and French are comfortable in using the four factor-model 
when explaining returns of a global portfolio (i.e a mutual fund with global stocks) as 
long as the portfolio does not have a strong bias towards micro caps or stocks from a 
particular region. 
“Banks are much different from non-financials in many ways”, the “most salient 
distinction is that banks are subject to bank runs4 during panics and crises, not just by 
depositors but also by other creditors” (Gandhi and Lusting, 2015, pp. 2). Gordon and 
Metrick (2012) and Duffie (2010) illustrate how these runs occur and how they impact 
                                                          
4 Bank runs represent the rush from costumers to commercial banks in order to withdraw cash and close 





the banks liquidity. The liquidity dry-out and consequent bankruptcy is due to a chain of 
events. Both authors say that, nowadays, the banking system has changed. “Dealer 
banks” (securitized banking5) are playing an increasing role alongside with traditional 
banking6 (commercial banking), acting as both. In that scenario, bank runs related to the 
securitized banking strongly impacts commercial banking leading to runs on 
commercial banks as well. There are two types or bank runs, a traditional-banking run 
which is driven by the withdrawal of depositors and a securitized-banking run which is 
driven by withdrawal of repo agreements (Gordon and Metrick, 2012). In the recent 
crises of 2008, Gordon and Metrick argue that a run on the “securitized-banking” 
related to the prime mortgage and repo collaterals, was the trigger to the illiquidity of 
the banking system where banks couldn’t honor their demands to costumers. Since 
“financial crises are high marginal utility states for the average investor, the expected 
return on bank stocks should be specially sensitive to a variation in the anticipated 
financial disaster recovery rates of bank´s shareholders related to bank size, the 
regulatory regime, implicit government guarantees, and other characteristics” (see 
Gandhi and Lusting, 2015, pp. 2). “Dealer banks” (securitized banking) are often parts 
of large complex financial organizations whose failures can damage the economy 
significantly. As a result, they are sometimes considered “too big to fail” (Duffie, 2010). 
In this context, if a bank is “too big to fail”, the expected returns on its stock should be, 
in equilibrium, lower since, in some cases, governments absorb some of the largest 
bank´s tail risk. In this line of the thinking, Gandhi and Lusting (2015) studied the size 
effect of the balance sheet on bank stock returns and not just only the market value. 
                                                          
5 Firms formerly known as investment banks (e.g Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch) 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). 
6 “Business of making and holding loans, with insured demand deposits as the main source of funds.” 





Their paper is the first to document that the firm size on financial stocks is really about 
size and not about market capitalization. They  found that “the largest commercial bank 
stocks, ranked by total size of the balance sheet, have significantly lower risk-adjusted 
returns than small- and medium-sized bank stocks, even though large banks are 
significantly more levered” (see Gandhi and Lusting, 2015, pp. 1). This size effect is 
relative to book value and not to market capitalization documented by earlier authors. 
Gandhi and Lusting contribute a great deal in uncovering the size effect in financial 
stocks by constructing a size factor to be accounted for on the asset pricing model. 
Since large banks are more leveraged and more exposed to the market risk (large banks 
have higher betas than small banks) the risk-adjusted returns shouldn´t be much 
different from small banks “unless there is a bank-specific tail risk priced but not 
spanned” “consistent with government guarantees that protects shareholders of large, 
but not small banks, in disaster states” (Gandhi and Lusting, 2015, pp. 2).  They 
attributed the size effect in financial stocks to how tail risk is priced and this tail risk 
premium is determined by the bank´s loading on the size factor. The size factor is based 
on a principal component analysis to study the common variation of the bank´s payoffs. 
“Firms that are deemed systematically important have negative loadings on this size 
factor because they are less likely to be allowed to fail, by government guarantees, in 
the event of a financial disaster” (Gandhi and Lusting, 2015, pp. 5). Previous authors 
did not incorporate financial stocks on their studies because they believed that the 
leverage effect would affect their results. Since there´s a lack of knowledge on the size 
effect relative to commercial bank stocks, my contributions help to uncover the size 








a. Playing field 
 
For our study we selected commercial banks from the Eurozone7 to construct the 
portfolios. By doing this we made sure that all the banks in the sample are regulated by 
one single entity, the European Central Bank. Choosing a sample from the entire 
European Union would imply using banks with different currencies and different 
regulatory standards. We used Bankscope platform in order to gather the data. To 
follow the selection method used by Fama and French (1993) and Gandhi (2015), the 
banks must be active, listed, have positive book values and with at least two years of 
information. From this selection we ended up with 59 commercial banks that follow 
these criteria and thus eligible to test. Our sample takes in account 19 countries of the 
Eurozone since two of them entered in the last two years, Latvia and Lithuania, putting 
them out of the sample for the lack of information available. Also UK and Switzerland 
are not part of the EU and thus do not make our test. The test sample for this study 
covers 70,3% of operating income and 67% of total assets in all European Union 
commercial banks (Bankscope). We started our data from 01/01/2000 since information 
like Book value in some cases is updated annually and the euro was only introduced on 
01/01/1999. Similarly to previous authors, we collected monthly data, ended up with 
monthly returns, market values and book values for the last 15 years. The non-financial 
companies where obtained from DataStream platform. We gathered 1247 non-financial 
companies from all the main and secondary exchange markets for the countries in the 
study. We performed the same filters as in the previous group and ended up with 
                                                          
7 Eurozone is composed by; Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Estonia, 






monthly returns, market values and book values for the last 15 years as well. We then 
constructed the portfolios by grouping the stocks by size of market cap and book value 
in deciles. Meaning that the portfolio number one would be composed by the ten 
percent smallest stocks by size, market cap at first and then book value. Each year we 




In order to adjust the portfolio returns for exposure to the standard risk factors that 
explain cross-sectional variation in average returns on other portfolios of nonfinancial 
stocks and bonds we use the Fama and French three factor-model in accordance with 
Gandhi (2015). Like in Gandhi´s paper, we use the three factor model and also include 
two bond risk factors since we can see the core business of commercial banks as 
managing a portfolio of bonds of varying maturities and credit risk. The explanatory 
variables in the time series regression include market return, small minus big, high 
minus low and the two bond factors.  
𝑓𝑡 = [ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑠𝑚𝑏  ℎ𝑚𝑙  𝑙𝑡𝑔  𝑐𝑟𝑑 ] 
The terms 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡, 𝑠𝑚𝑏, and ℎ𝑚𝑙 represent returns on the three Fama-French factors 
on stock returns. We capture 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 by using the Datastream European monetary 
union stock index returns and subtracting the German one-month Treasury bill rate8. 
Both returns were withdrawn from Thomson Reuters Datastream platform. In order to 
get the 𝑠𝑚𝑏 and ℎ𝑚𝑙 returns we used the Fama&French construction method, we sort 
                                                          
8 We use the German Treasury bill  as risk free rate since it´s close to the Euro area yield curve based 





stocks into two market cap groups and three book-to-market equity groups. We then 
constructed a six value-weighted (two-dimensional) portfolios. 𝑠𝑚𝑏 is the equal-weight 
average of the returns on the three smallest stock portfolios for the region minus the 
average of the returns on the three bigger stocks portfolios9. ℎ𝑚𝑙 is the equal-weight 
average of the returns for the two high B/M portfolios for a region minus the average of 
the returns for the two low B/M portfolios10. The size factor or 𝑠𝑚𝑏 factor “Small 
minus Big” measures the return differential between the average small cap and the 
average big cap portfolios, while the book-to-market factor or ℎ𝑚𝑙 factor “High minus 
Low” measures the return differential between the average value and the average 
growth portfolios11. We use 𝑙𝑡𝑔 to denote the excess returns on a 10-year Government 
bond index for the Euro monetary union drawn from DataStream platform. We use 𝑐𝑟𝑑 
to denote the excess returns on the Iboxx Euro monetary union corporate bond index 
downloadable from Datastream.  The excess returns are computed based on our risk-
free rate, the German one-month T-bill. Having all the variables we are able to regress 
the monthly excess returns for each size sorted portfolio on the Fama-French three stock 
factors and two bond factors. For each 𝑖 portfolio we run the following time series 





= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,´𝑓𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑖  , 
 
                                                          
9 SMB = 1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) – 1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big 
Growth). 
10 HML = 1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) – 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth). 
11 The Fama-French factors were computed based on the method used by them in previous works and 








= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚
𝑖 (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏
𝑖 (𝑅𝑠𝑚𝑏
𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑙
𝑖 (𝑅ℎ𝑚𝑙
𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓) +
𝛽𝑙𝑡𝑔
𝑖 (𝑅𝑙𝑡𝑔
𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑐𝑟𝑑
𝑖 (𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑑
𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑖 , 
 
3. Results and outputs 
 
 
Table I provides the results of the regression specified in equation (2) relative to 
commercial banks in the European monetary union. The portfolios are ranked from 
smallest (1) to the largest (2) in terms of market value (market cap) and Book value. 
The table reports the regression coefficients for each size-sorted portfolio with 5% 
confidence level along with 𝑅2. Panel A reports the results based on sorting by market 
capitalization into deciles. The estimated intercepts do not assume a monotonically 
decrease but it is clearly noticeable an excess return on the smallest portfolios by market 
cap. The intercepts are positive for the first, second and forth portfolio, here we can see 
that the largest porfolios earn lower returns when compared with the smallest portfolios. 
Also when looking for the difference between the largest and smallest portfolio (10-1), 
the intercept is negative (–2,3%) at 5% confidence level, meaning that going long on the 
smallest portfolio and short on the largest would give a 2,3% excess returns. When we 
look at the 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 factor the opposite happens. There isn´t a size tendency upwards or 
downwards but it is noticeable that larger firms tend to have higher market risk. On the 




) the estimated variables explain better the bigger portfolios just 





0,366 on the 10th. By looking at the ANOVA output on the table III12 we can see that 
the significance level is 0, below 0,05, leading us to say that the model is significant for 
all portfolios and that the coefficients estimated by the regression are statistically 
different. Now testing the multicollinearity of the coefficients on table V, we won´t 
suspect of any multicollinearity problems since all of our VIF (variance inflation factor) 
is low and way below 5. On the Panel B, representing the portfolios size-ranked for 
book value on commercial banks, we can´t see a size tendency on the constant (α) or on 
the rest of the coefficients except for the 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 factor that has bigger returns for 
larger firms at a 5% confidence level. As for the 𝑅2 we notice that the model is more 












                                                          






This table presents estimates from OLS regression of monthly value-weighted excess 
returns on each size sorted portfolio of Euro monetary union commercial banks on the 
three Fama and French (1993) stock and two bond risk factors. Market, smb, and hml 
are the three Fama-French stock factors: market, small minus big, and high minus low, 
respectively. ltg is the excess return on an index of long-term German government bond 
and crd is the excess return on an index of investment-grade corporate bonds. * indicate 
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0,121 0,365 0,362 0,353 0,263 0,555 0,678 0,791 0,797 0,366 0,198 
   small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 
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Table I shows the coefficients and 𝑅2 for the regression based on portfolios ranked on 
size for market value and book value using only non-financial companies. The goal here 
is to compare with the commercial banks and record some kind of behavior as on 
Gandhi (2015). Panel A refers to the portfolios ranked on market value. Analyzing 
panel A we cannot see a clear tendency for the constant. The market beta shows the 
same behavior as for commercial banks, however this behavior is less noticeable. The 
returns on 𝑠𝑚𝑏 and  ℎ𝑚𝑙 show a size propensity for the smallest companies since the 
excess returns are bigger on the first portfolios constructed on size of market cap. At the 
same time is clear that the model does a good job explaining the variability of the 
dependent variable. Panel B shows a slight size factor when portfolios are formed on 
book value. It is clear, at a 5% confidence level, that the constant for the first and 
smallest five portfolios is higher than the last five and largest portfolios. Also, the 
portfolio (10-1) shows that; by investing on the largest portfolio (10) and short-selling 
the smallest portfolio (1) we would earn negative returns of -0,9% per month, meaning 
that, by inverting this strategy we would get abnormal returns in the same percentage. 
Again, the market beta shows higher values for largest companies. As for 𝑠𝑚𝑏 and  ℎ𝑚𝑙 
they show higher intercepts for smallest firms. The ANOVA output on the table IV 
shows the same result for both panels, the significance levels are all 0 and the Z values 
are high, meaning that the coefficients are statistically different in between portfolios 
and the model is significant. The test for the multicollinearity on table VI shows that 
there is no evidence of multicollinearity between factors since the numbers for VIF are 
all low and below 5 for both panels. Table VII shows the results for the average 





average excess returns between each portfolio but the outputs on table V refer only to 
the smallest (1) and largest (10) portfolios since the results came similar and the main 
goal here is to compare the smallest and largest returns. When looking at Panel A of the 
table VII, we can see a difference on average returns between the two portfolios, and 
when looking at the significance level this comes higher than 0,05 and thus we can 
assume similar variances. From here we can assume that the difference in the average 
excess monthly returns of the portfolios is statistically plausible. Then is possible to say 
that the average returns from the smallest and largest portfolios are statistically 
different. The same conclusion we take from analyzing the panel B of the table VII, we 









This table presents estimates from OLS regression of monthly value-weighted excess 
returns on each size sorted portfolio of Euro monetary union non-financial stock firms 
on the three Fama and French (1993) stock and two bond risk factors. Market, smb, and 
hml are the three Fama-French stock factors: market, small minus big, and high minus 
low, respectively. ltg is the excess return on an index of long-term German government 
bond and crd is the excess return on an index of investment-grade corporate bonds. * 
indicate statistical signicance at the 5%,level. The sample is from 2000 to 2015 in Panel 
A and B.  
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0,712 0,851 0,898 0,891 0,897 0,886 0,875 0,894 0,902 0,937 0,599 
 small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1 



















































4. Conclusion and Suggestion 
 
Our paper contributes on documenting size effects in commercial bank stock. After 
regressing the size ranked portfolios and performing the tests; we conclude that there is 
not a clear size effect in the Euro monetary union like the one documented by Gandhi 
for the U.S stock market. The results show a little tendency on favor of the small stocks. 
The excess returns on the smallest firms for the commercial banks are more visible on 
the Panel A relative to the market value. As for the excess returns in the non-financial 
companies this excess returns are more visible on Panel B relative to book value. If we 
only look for the difference between the largest portfolios and the smallest, both panels 
for commercial banks and panel B for non-financial firms show that this strategy leads 
to negative returns. This means that if we invert the strategy, and assuming a buying and 
selling strategy, going long on the smallest portfolio and short the largest we would earn 
27% per year on commercial banks ranked by market cap and 2,4% per year ranked by 
book value. Following the same strategy we would earn 10,8% per year on non-
financial firms ranked on book value. When comparing commercial banks and non-
financial firms, only the market returns and small minus big are significant at 5% 
confidence level for commercial banks, whereas on the non-financial firms, market, 
small minus big and high minus low are significant at 5% level of confidence. Now 
when comparing between small and big related to market risk it is clear that the largest 
commercial banks have more market risk as we expect since they manage the worlds 
wealth and when there is a bank run the largest banks are the ones that suffer the most.  
This tells us that the factors used to replicate the maturity risk and credit risk are barely 
significant when using the model to compute returns and that the book value does take 





accounted for both on commercial banks and non-financial firms for the Euro monetary 
union but the results don´t show a big and evident proof of that like in previous works. 
Big caution is needed when interpreting the results and choosing a strategy since the 
reasons behind the size effect are still to uncover and especially across markets and 
regulatory regimes. 
This paper intended to create more knowledge related to the existing evidences on size 
effects. For this matter we tried to follow methodologies used and performed by 
previous authors in very important works. The reasons behind this size effect are very 
difficult to prove, despite the fact that Gandhi did a great job in order to uncover this 
size effect for banks. However there is still a big controversy about it. The suspicions 
unveiled with this paper is that this size effect is stronger on the North American stock 
market than in the European euro zone market. The size of the market is a factor to take 
in account when comparing the results and trying to get any explanation, as well as the 
liquidity and number of transaction per day of both markets. In the end, other fields, 
such as behavior and culture on finance, may significantly influence markets and thus 
these particular size effects. The fact that there are more players involved in stock 
trading in the U.S market may affect the awareness of certain stocks for instance; big, 
successful and well known firms are popular and more people are aware of them, 
making them a “sure thing” for investors, but in the other hand they may be overpricing 
this stocks ready to crash.  
The limitations of the work performed are related to the lack of banks and differences in 
commercial bank sizes. In order to do a thorough work, as performed by Gandhi, the 
sample gets very restricted. In addition to that, there is a big difference in the 





adequately and to develop an efficient work, it is necessary to have an exquisite and 
professional tool, rather than a simple Excel worksheet, namely because we are dealing 
with giant data.  
The work to be done here is to try to understand the reasons behind this size effect or to 
add more proof of this size effect for different types of markets and try to find a 
resemblance. We would suggest a comparison between regions of the same 
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This table presents the ANOVA outputs of the regressions for the European monetary 
union commercial banks. The results are dived per size sorted portfolios formed on 




Portfolio   
Sum of 
squares df Mean Square Z Sig. 
1 
Regression ,125 5 ,025 4,843 ,000  
Residual ,905 175 ,005     
Total 1,030 180       
2 
Regression ,239 5 ,048 15,889 ,000  
Residual ,526 175 ,003     
Total ,765 180       
3 
Regression ,243 5 ,049 20,345 ,000 
Residual ,419 175 ,002     
Total ,662 180       
4 
Regression ,321 5 ,064 25,465 ,000  
Residual ,442 175 ,003     
Total ,763 180       
5 
Regression ,607 5 ,121 56,086 ,000  
Residual ,379 175 ,002     
Total ,986 180       
6 
Regression ,878 5 ,176 50,384 ,000  
Residual ,610 175 ,003     
Total 1,488 180       
7 
Regression ,705 5 ,141 69,711 ,000  
Residual ,354 175 ,002     
Total 1,060 180       
8 
Regression ,907 5 ,181 97,283 ,000  
Residual ,326 175 ,002     
Total 1,234 180       





Residual ,213 175 ,001     
Total 1,322 180       
10 
Regression 1,225 5 ,245 212,387 ,000  
Residual ,202 175 ,001     
Total 1,426 180       
(10-1) 
Regression 1,225 5 ,245 212,387 ,000  
Residual ,202 175 ,001     







Portfolio   
Sum of 
squares df Mean Square Z Sig. 
1 
Regression ,071 5 ,014 4,804 ,000  
Residual ,515 174 ,003     
Total 0,586 179       
2 
Regression ,281 5 ,056 20,046 ,000  
Residual ,488 174 ,003     
Total ,770 179       
3 
Regression ,345 5 ,069 19,705 ,000  
Residual ,609 174 ,003     
Total ,953 179       
4 
Regression ,217 5 ,043 19,014 ,000  
Residual ,398 174 ,002     
Total ,615 179       
5 
Regression ,299 5 ,060 12,415 ,000  
Residual ,837 174 ,005     
Total 1,136 179       
6 
Regression 1,028 5 ,206 43,460 ,000  
Residual ,823 174 ,005     
Total 1,850 179       
7 
Regression 1,239 5 ,248 73,329 ,000  
Residual ,588 174 ,003     
Total 1,827 179       
8 
Regression 1,499 5 ,300 131,312 ,000  
Residual ,397 174 ,002     
Total 1,896 179       
9 
Regression 1,133 5 ,227 136,973 ,000  
Residual ,288 174 ,002     
Total 1,421 179       





Residual 1,847 174 ,011     
Total 2,911 179       
(10-1) 
Regression 0,649 5 ,130 8,604 ,000  
Residual 2,627 174 ,015     






This table presents the ANOVA outputs of the regressions for the European monetary 
union non-financial companies. The results are dived per size sorted portfolios, formed 
on market value and book value. The samples is from 2000 to 2015 for panel A and 




Portfolio   
Sum of 
squares df Mean Square Z Sig. 
1 
Regression ,320 5 ,064 86,411 ,000 
Residual ,130 175 ,001     
Total ,450 180       
2 
Regression ,413 5 ,083 200,663 ,000 
Residual ,072 175 ,000     
Total ,486 180       
3 
Regression ,441 5 ,088 308,097 ,000 
Residual ,050 175 ,000     
Total ,491 180       
4 
Regression ,439 5 ,088 286,898 ,000 
Residual ,054 175 ,000     
Total ,493 180       
5 
Regression ,483 5 ,097 305,819 ,000 
Residual ,055 175 ,000     
Total ,539 180       
6 
Regression ,452 5 ,090 270,803 ,000 
Residual ,058 175 ,000     
Total ,511 180       
7 
Regression ,453 5 ,091 244,279 ,000 
Residual ,065 175 ,000     
Total ,518 180       
8 
Regression ,458 5 ,092 295,727 ,000 
Residual ,054 175 ,000     






Regression ,452 5 ,090 321,694 ,000 
Residual ,049 175 ,000     
Total ,501 180       
10 
Regression ,435 5 ,087 520,295 ,000 
Residual ,029 175 ,000     
Total ,464 180       
(10-1) 
Regression ,191 5 ,038 52,330 ,000 
Residual ,128 175 ,001     





Portfolio   
Sum of 
squares df Mean Square Z Sig. 
1 
Regression ,167 5 ,033 54,449 ,000 
Residual ,107 175 ,001     
Total ,274 180       
2 
Regression ,249 5 ,050 101,476 ,000 
Residual ,086 175 ,000     
Total ,335 180       
3 
Regression ,588 5 ,118 378,444 ,000 
Residual ,054 175 ,000     
Total ,642 180       
4 
Regression ,307 5 ,061 164,071 ,000 
Residual ,066 175 ,000     
Total ,373 180       
5 
Regression ,402 5 ,080 229,422 ,000 
Residual ,061 175 ,000     
Total ,463 180       
6 
Regression ,460 5 ,092 325,716 ,000 
Residual ,049 175 ,000     
Total ,509 180       
7 
Regression ,484 5 ,097 309,017 ,000 
Residual ,055 175 ,000     
Total ,539 180       
8 
Regression ,552 5 ,110 231,505 ,000 
Residual ,084 175 ,000     
Total ,636 180       
9 
Regression ,469 5 ,094 301,992 ,000 
Residual ,054 175 ,000     
Total ,523 180       





Residual ,040 175 ,000     
Total ,443 180       
(10-1) 
Regression ,487 5 ,097 229,646 ,000 
Residual ,074 175 ,000     








This table presents the tests to multicollinearity performed to the factors of the 
regressions for the European monetary union on commercial banks. The results are 
presented for each of the regression representing a portfolio. Panel A represents the test 
for portfolios ranked by market and panel B represents the test for portfolios ranked by 





Portfolio Collinearity Statistics 
    Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
2 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
3 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
4 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 





HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
5 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
6 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
7 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
8 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
9 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
10 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,362 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,048 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,029 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
(10-1) (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,540 1,852 
SmB-Rf ,729 1,372 





lgt-Rf ,491 2,037 















Portfolio Collinearity Statistics 
    Tolerância VIF 
1 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
2 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
3 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
4 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
5 (Constante)     





SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
6 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
7 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
8 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
9 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 
crd-Rf ,556 1,799 
10 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,539 1,855 
SmB-Rf ,734 1,363 
HmL-Rf ,955 1,047 
lgt-Rf ,493 2,030 



























This table presents the tests to multicollinearity performed to the factors of the 
regressions for the European monetary union on non-financial companies. The results 
are presented for each of the regression representing a portfolio. Panel A represents the 
test for portfolios ranked by market and panel B represents the test for portfolios ranked 






Portfolio Collinearity Statistics 
    Tolerância VIF 
1 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,904 1,106 
HmL-Rf ,968 1,033 
lgt-Rf ,479 2,088 
crd-Rf ,522 1,915 
2 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
3 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
4 (Constante)     





SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
5 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
6 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
7 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
8 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
9 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
10 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
(10-1) (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 





HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 













Portfolio Collinearity Statistics 
    Tolerância VIF 
1 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,904 1,106 
HmL-Rf ,968 1,033 
lgt-Rf ,479 2,088 
crd-Rf ,522 1,915 
2 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
3 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
4 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
5 (Constante)     





SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
6 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
7 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
8 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
9 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
10 (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 
crd-Rf ,519 1,926 
(10-1) (Constante)     
Rm-Rf ,600 1,666 
SmB-Rf ,900 1,111 
HmL-Rf ,971 1,030 
lgt-Rf ,478 2,094 




















This table shows the results for t-student test for different means of independent 
samples. This test is for the European monetary union market for commercial banks. 
Panel A is relative to portfolios ranked by market value and panel B is relative to 








      Test for independent samples     
  
Levene test for iqual variance       














      Test for independent samples     
  
Levene test for iqual variance       






























This table shows the results for t-student test for different means of independent 
samples. This test is for the European monetary union market for non-financial 
companies. Panel A is relative to portfolios ranked by market value and panel B is 








    Test for independent samples     
  
Levene test for iqual variance       

















    Test for independent samples     
  
Levene test for iqual variance       









    -1,539 359,907 ,012 
 
